Data from Model: Extracting Data from Non-robust and Robust Models by Benz, Philipp et al.
Data from Model: Extracting Data from Non-robust and Robust Models
Philipp Benz∗ Chaoning Zhang∗ Tooba Imtiaz In-So Kweon
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Abstract
The essence of deep learning is to exploit data to train a
deep neural network (DNN) model. This work explores the
reverse process of generating data from a model, attempting
to reveal the relationship between the data and the model.
We repeat the process of Data to Model (DtM) and Data
from Model (DfM) in sequence and explore the loss of fea-
ture mapping information by measuring the accuracy drop
on the original validation dataset. We perform this experi-
ment for both a non-robust and robust origin model. Our
results show that the accuracy drop is limited even after
multiple sequences of DtM and DfM, especially for robust
models. The success of this cycling transformation can be
attributed to the shared feature mapping existing in data
and model. Using the same data, we observe that different
DtM processes result in models having different features,
especially for different network architecture families, even
though they achieve comparable performance.
1. Introduction
In deep learning applications, such as image classifica-
tion [6, 18], data is used to train deep neural network (DNN)
models. This work explores the reverse process of gen-
erating data from the model, with one general question in
mind: What is the relationship between data and model?
This question cannot be addressed well by only focusing
on the model training process, Data To Model (DtM) [8].
Thus we combine the widely adopted DtM with its reverse
process of Data from Model (DfM). More specifically, we
repeat the process of DtM and DfM in sequence and mea-
sure the accuracy over the original validation dataset. In
this chaining process, we always assume access to only ei-
ther the data or the model generated in the previous process.
More specifically, in the DtM process, we can only access
the data generated from the previous DfM process, and sim-
ilarly, in the DfM process, we only access the model gen-
erated by the previous DtM process. This chain process is
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Figure 1: The chain of performing DtM and DfM repeti-
tively. The blue arrows indicate the DtM process and the
red arrows indicate the DfM process.
depicted in Figure 1.
Our work is mainly inspired by [7] which attributes the
success of adversarial examples to the existence of non-
robust features (mappings) in a dataset. During the typi-
cal DtM process, these non-robust features are learned by
a model which consequently has the same non-robust fea-
tures. This indicates the feature mapping as the link be-
tween data and model. In their work, the original training
dataset is adopted as the background image in the data ex-
traction process [7]. In this work, we explore the possibil-
ity of retrieving a learned feature mapping from a trained
model without the original training dataset, which makes
the DfM process more meaningful. Moreover, we iterate
the DtM and DfM process in sequence instead of just per-
forming it once. Another aspect of this work is to explore
whether such feature mappings are the same or different for
different runs for the same or different architectures.
To decode the learned features of a model into a dataset
without knowledge of the original training data, we adopt
random substitute datasets as background to increase sam-
ple diversity and introduce virtual logits to model the logit
behavior of DNNs. Our experiments show that we can ob-
tain models with similar properties as the original model in
terms of both accuracy and robustness. We showcase the
effectiveness of our approach on MNIST and CIFAR10 for
both non-robust and robust origin models.
2. Related Work
DNNs are vulnerable to small, imperceptible perturba-
tions [13]. This intriguing phenomenon led to various at-
tack [4, 2, 9, 11, 16] and defense methods [3]. Interpreta-
tions for the reason of the existence of adversarial examples
have been explored in [4, 14, 17]. Ilyas et al. [7] attributed
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the phenomenon of adversarial examples to the existence
of non-robust features. They introduce features as a map-
ping relationship from the input to the output. We adopt
this definition and aim to extract this feature mapping from
the model to the data. Model visualization methods [12, 10]
can be seen as a DfM method, without training a new model
on the extracted data. Such methods are commonly further
exploited for model compression [5, 1] techniques. Instead
of compressing models, [15] aims to compress an entire
dataset into only a few synthetic images. Training on these
few synthetic images, however, leads to a serious perfor-
mance drop.
3. Methodology
Given a K-classification dataset D consisting of data
samples x ∈ Rd and their corresponding true class y ∈
[1,K], a DNN Mθ (θ omitted from now on) parame-
terized through the weights θ is commonly trained via
mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to achieve
argminθ E(x,y)∼D[L(θ, x, y)]. In this work, we term this
process DtM (data to model) and we explore its reverse
process of extracting data D′ from modelM (DfM). More
specifically, starting from origin dataset D0 DtM results in
origin model M0, with DfM, D1 can be extracted which
leads toM1 through DtM and so on. During the DtM and
DfM process, we assume having no access to the previous
models and datasets, respectively.
To retrieve features from a model and store them in the
form of data, we deploy the l2-variant of projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) [9]. Due to the absence of the original
dataset, we leverage substitute images xs from a substitute
dataset Ds, as well as virtual logits Zv as the target values
for the gradient-based optimization process. We specify the
logit output of a classifier as Zθ(·) and use the l2-loss be-
tween the network output logit and the virtual target logit
||Zθ(xs) − Zv||2 as the loss function optimized by PGD.
The retrieved dataset consists of images x′s = xs+δ, where
δ indicates a vector optimized through PGD and x′s lies in
the range [0, 1]. The data samples x′s and their respective
output logit values Zθ(x′s) represent the new dataset.
After the DfM process, the retrieved dataset can be
used in the DtM process, by training the model weights θ′
with the l2-distance between the previously stored ground
truth logit vector and the output logit vector, ||Zθ(x′s) −
Zθ′(x
′
s)||2.
We heuristically found a simple scheme of Gaussian dis-
tributed values N (µ, σ) for the virtual logits. The highest
logit is determined by N (20, 2), and the mean values of
the remaining logit values are equally separated between
[−3, 3] with σ = 1. The order of logit values is chosen
randomly to introduce diversity into the dataset.
In the above process, the origin modelM0 is non-robust.
Following [7] we also use a robust model forM0 obtained
Figure 2: Qualitative results for the DfM process starting
from a non-robust origin model (5 columns on the left) and
a robust origin model (5 columns on the right). The first row
indicates the origin dataset. The subsequent rows indicate
the obtained dataset after the n-th DtM and DfM process.
The results are shown for the LeNet architecture with Fash-
ion MNIST as the background images.
with adversarial training and repeat the chaining process.
4. Experiments
4.1. DfM and DtM in sequence
We sequentially apply DfM and DtM starting from the
origin modelM0. The non-robust and robust origin models
M0 are obtained through standard and adversarial training,
respectively, on LeNet for MNIST and VGG8 for CIFAR10.
VGG8 refers to a VGG network with only one convolu-
tion layer between each max pooling operation. To obtain
Di from the preceding model Mi−1, 500k images are ex-
tracted fromMi−1 through the DfM process. For the back-
ground images, we choose Fashion MNIST and MS-COCO
as background images for MNIST and CIFAR10, respec-
tively. The generated images are shown in Figure 2. In
subsequent DtM, dataset Di is then used to train the model
Mi which is an independent model of the same architec-
ture. The accuracy for all models is reported on the original
validation dataset. We present the results with five repeti-
tions of this process in Table 1.
Qualitative results in Figure 2 show that the extracted
images look totally different from the original images, due
to which it might be tempting to expect the models trained
on them will work poorly on the original validation dataset.
Table 1, however, shows that comparable performance is
achieved and this is due to similar feature mappings exist-
ing in the generated images despite the large visual discrep-
ancy. Nonetheless, we observe that there is a general trend
that the accuracies for both the non-robust and robust mod-
els decrease for each sequence of DfM/DtM. The accuracy
increase by 1.1% from M0 to M1 for the robust VGG8
Table 1: Applying DtM and DfM in sequence for standard
and adversarially trained models.
LeNet (MNIST) VGG8 (CIFAR10)
non-robustM0 robustM0 non-robustM0 robustM0
M0 99.5 98.7 92.2 87.0
M1 98.5 97.7 89.4 88.1
M2 96.6 96.1 80.1 82.5
M3 91.5 95.2 66.8 71.7
M4 87.4 94.2 52.5 58.7
M5 76.5 93.7 27.5 44.8
Table 2: Robustness evaluation of the models obtained dur-
ing the chaining process for a non-robust (left) and robust
(right) origin model. The results are reported for the LeNet
architecture on MNIST.
non-robustM0 robustM0
 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
M0 99.5 74.2 4.5 0.1 0.1 98.7 91.0 58.9 10.6 0.7
M1 98.5 61.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 97.7 81.1 25.4 1.1 0.0
M2 96.6 31.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 96.1 71.2 12.4 0.1 0.0
M3 91.5 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.2 54.2 3.24 0.2 0.1
M4 87.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.2 31.8 1.0 0.1 0.3
M5 76.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.7 13.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
model is the only exception to this. For the non-robust ori-
gin modelM0, the accuracy drop is trivial in the first few
iterations of the DfM and DtM process and it becomes more
observable in later iterations. For the robust origin model
M0, the accuracy is retained better. For example, the ro-
bust LeNet only decreases by 5% fromM0 toM5, while
the non-robust LeNet decreases by 23%.
We further investigate the robustness to adversarial ex-
amples for the models from the DfM/DtM process. There-
fore we evaluate the different retrieved MNIST models on
adversarial examples generated with l2-PGD under differ-
ent  ∈ {0, 4}, 20 update steps and the corresponding step
size calculated as 2.5/steps. Similar to the observed ac-
curacy drop for clean images, a similar trend occurs when
the model is under attack. However, the accuracy degrada-
tion seems to be more severe for robustness. For example,
the accuracy of the non-robust LeNet drops from 74.2% to
0.0% for a relatively weak attack of  = 1 while the clean
image accuracy drops from 99.5% to 76.5%. Similar be-
havior is observed for the models originating from the ro-
bustM0. It is worth mentioning that the models originat-
ing from the robust M0 are consistently more robust than
their counterparts originating from the non-robustM0. Af-
ter two subsequent DfM iterations starting from the robust
M0,M2 still shows similar robustness as the standard non-
robust model M0. This result suggests that DfM can be
Table 3: Cross-training of the extracted datasets from non-
robust (top) and robust (bottom) models. The models were
originally trained on CIFAR10. The robust models were
adversarially trained with the l2 variant of PGD. The rows
indicate the model from which the data was extracted. The
columns indicate the trained model. The values indicate the
accuracy of the CIFAR-10 test dataset.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet18 ResNet50
no
n-
ro
b. VGG16 (93.8) 89.6 90.1 89.9 90.3
VGG19 (93.6) 89.7 90.1 90.6 90.3
ResNet18 (95.1) 87.9 88.0 89.7 89.6
ro
bu
st VGG16 (88.7) 90.3 90.5 90.3 90.5
VGG19 (87.6) 87.9 88.0 88.0 88.1
ResNet18 (90.2) 91.3 91.1 91.6 91.5
applied as an alternative to adversarial training.
4.2. DfM and DtM on different architectures
The above analysis shows that DtM and DfM can be per-
formed for the same and simple architecture with a limited
performance drop. Here we apply DfM to the standard and
adversarially trained CIFAR10 models and train different
state-of-the-art architectures on the extracted data. For sim-
plicity we stop the chaining process after obtaining M1.
The results in Table 3 show that all model architectures can
be successfully trained on the extracted data. Similar to Ta-
ble 1, a performance drop is observed for the data extracted
from the non-robust M0. For the robust M0, however,
we observe that the retrainedM1 consistently outperforms
their corresponding M0 for both similar and different ar-
chitectures, which is somewhat surprising.
4.3. Do different models learn different feature
mappings?
Given the possibility to extract a certain feature mapping
from a model, in this section, we analyze whether differ-
ent models trained from the same origin dataset D0 have
different feature mappings. To this end, we utilize 10k fea-
ture images extracted from models trained under the same
conditions, and perform a cross-evaluation of the model ac-
curacy on each other. The results for models with standard
and adversarial training are reported in Table 4. We observe
that the cross-evaluation accuracies are higher than random
guess, which indicates that some shared feature mappings
are learned. However, for both non-robust and robust mod-
els only in a few cases an accuracy higher than 50% is
achieved. This phenomenon can also be observed when the
extracted dataset was evaluated on an independently trained
instance of the same architecture as the original architec-
ture. The relatively low cross-evaluation accuracies illus-
trate that models from different runs learn different features
Table 4: Cross-evaluation of datasets extracted from non-
robust (top) and robust (bottom) models. The models were
originally trained on CIFAR-10. The robust models were
obtained with adversarial training via the l2 variant of PGD.
The diagonal values were obtained for the same architecture
but a different training run. The accuracy of the extracted
data on the original model is 100%.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet18 ResNet50
no
n-
ro
bu
st VGG16 43.2 40.4 36.5 30.5
VGG19 50.1 48.7 45.4 37.8
ResNet18 36.9 34.9 55.2 43.8
ResNet50 41.3 40.6 60.0 62.6
ro
bu
st
VGG16 48.5 43.6 45.4 44.0
VGG19 38.3 38.9 36.9 36.0
ResNet18 42.0 37.8 50.1 47.7
ResNet50 35.4 31.9 39.7 35.7
which are not fully compatible with each other.
Another interesting observation is that model architec-
tures from the same network family, VGG family for in-
stance, seem to have more common feature mappings than
different architectures. For example, for the feature images
extracted from the standard ResNet50, the ResNet networks
exhibit an accuracy of around 60%, while the VGG net-
works only show an accuracy of around 40%. This phe-
nomenon is more prevalent in non-robust models than in
robust models. Overall, the results show that different mod-
els learn different feature mappings from the same dataset
even though they have comparable classification accuracy.
5. Conclusion
In this work we introduced the Data from Model (DfM)
process, a technique to reverse the conventional model
training process, by extracting data back from the model. A
model trained on the generated dataset that look totally dif-
ferent from the original dataset can achieve comparable per-
formance as their counterparts trained on the origin dataset.
The success of this technique confirmed feature mapping as
the link between data and model. Our work provides in-
sight about the relationship between data and model as well
understanding of model robustness.
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